safety security
The Retrieval Gate Reads the Page Before the Generator Does
An open-weight decision model cuts hidden-instruction attacks to 5.7 percent and nearly eliminates fake-page exposure in a pollution test.
Summary
An open-weight decision model cuts hidden-instruction attacks to 5.7 percent and nearly eliminates fake-page exposure in a pollution test.
A released four-billion-parameter decision model answers typed questions about retrieved HTML without generating tokens, making it a screening layer for prompt injection and synthetic-page pollution. On 1,000 forum-style questions, attack success fell from 27.9 percent with no defense to 13.6 percent with published mitigations and 5.7 percent with the gate; four of 186 benign instruction-bearing pages were wrongly flagged. In a separate test where two thirds of candidate pages were fake, filtering before top-ten selection held exposure to 0.5 percent and accuracy to 83 percent, compared with 28 percent accuracy without filtering. These results are benchmark-specific, but they favor gating the pool before retrieval commits.
Why it matters
An open-weight decision model cuts hidden-instruction attacks to 5.7 percent and nearly eliminates fake-page exposure in a pollution test.
Limits and context
No additional limitation was separately recorded.
Key claims
An open-weight decision model cuts hidden-instruction attacks to 5.7 percent and nearly eliminates fake-page exposure in a pollution test.
Evidence: source-2026-11-08-016
Sources
- arXiv preprint 2611.08325, original v1arXiv · primary research
Corrections
No corrections have been recorded for this story.